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EXPERIMENTING WITH THE LEAD PLAINTIFF
SELECTION PROCESS IN SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS: A SUGGESTION FOR PSLRA REFORM
Andrew S. Gold*
INTRODUCTION
Reform proposals for securities class actions are not a novel devel-
opment. The selection of securities lead plaintiffs has been a source of
substantial innovation over the past dozen years, and many of these
developments are only now providing insights into their litigation
effects.
The lead plaintiff and lead counsel selection process for securities
class actions, however, is now the subject of several additional reform
proposals.1 A central concern is whether securities class actions re-
main an attorney-directed form of litigation, one in which the interests
of plaintiffs' counsel and the plaintiff class may be imperfectly aligned.
Ideally, the lead plaintiff will adequately monitor the course of the
lawsuit, but the practice of lead plaintiff selection-particularly in
cases of "pay-to-play" relationships-does not always inspire
confidence.
This Article will not offer a specific solution to this agency cost con-
cern. Instead, it suggests legislative reform aimed at producing such
solutions in the future. Rather than just enact legislation that directly
targets the lead plaintiff's monitoring role, legislatures should also al-
locate additional authority to courts to refine existing measures.
Greater judicial discretion over the lead plaintiff selection process
would permit judges to make adjustments as needed and would pro-
vide more useful evidence as to which practices are successful.
If Congress wishes to narrowly adjust the law to test a particular
lead plaintiff or lead counsel selection device, several options would
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I would like to thank John Beck-
erman and Stephan Landsman for their helpful comments on the ideas in this Article. I would
also like to thank Michael Pullos for his excellent research assistance. Any errors are my own.
1. Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 5491, 109th
Cong. (2006) (proposing reforms to lead plaintiff selection process); INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 82-84 (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/research.html. See also infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (provid-
ing examples of recent reform proposals).
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be available. For example, a recent bill would have explicitly recog-
nized auctions for lead counsel as a judicial option. 2 The bill also
called for enhanced disclosure requirements to address pay-to-play
concerns. 3 In addition, commentators recently suggested measures to
entice additional institutional investors to seek lead plaintiff status
through payment of litigation expenses. 4 Any of these changes, or
some combination, might be helpful.
This Article suggests a more structural approach to resolving the
relationship between lead plaintiff and lead counsel. The drafters of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA) were ap-
propriately concerned with inducing improvements in lead plaintiffs'
monitoring of securities class action litigation. However, the relevant
actors are dynamic-not static-entities. Further, the full effects of
the PSLRA are both evolving and difficult to measure. In light of the
ways in which institutional investors, plaintiffs' counsel, and courts
have already responded to the PSLRA, there is a risk that any
targeted legislative revision to the PSLRA will be outdated shortly
after enactment.
Thus, Congress should retain the overall PSLRA framework, but
provide courts with more flexibility in selecting lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel. Adjudicative problem solving is an imperfect process, but it
enables incremental adjustments to take into account the interactions
among the relevant parties. Judicial experimentation could also pro-
vide a more complete picture as to which approaches actually work
and which do not.
Part II of this Article describes the evolving impact of the PSLRA,
including unanticipated outcomes under the statute.5 That Part out-
lines the pay-to-play concern and its possible significance for the at-
torney-client relationship. It also reviews recent empirical data
suggesting that aggregation-and perhaps auctions-may have posi-
tive effects upon securities class actions in certain contexts. In light of
these developments, Part III discusses the role that courts might take
2. See H.R. 5491, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing language that would state the following: "In
exercising the discretion of the court over the approval of lead counsel, the court may employ
alternative means in the selection and retention of counsel for the most adequate plaintiff, in-
cluding a competitive bidding process.").
3. Id. (requiring a disclosure "that identifies any conflict of interest, including any direct or
indirect payment, between such attorney and such plaintiff and between such attorney and any
affiliated person of such plaintiff"). This proposed section of the statute would also require the
court to "make a determination of whether such conflict is sufficient to disqualify the attorney
from representing the plaintiff." Id.
4. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 9-85 and accompanying text.
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under the present statutory text.6 This discussion develops the idea of
judicial experimentation as a response to the complexities of the lead
plaintiff selection process. However, the current statutory text sub-
stantially limits such judicial discretion. Part IV suggests legislative
reform to provide courts with greater discretion in this area. 7 Part V
concludes that an enhanced role for judicial experimentation would be
A desirable reform.8
II. A REVIEW OF POsT-PSLRA DEVELOPMENTS
In 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA to address the misuse of se-
curities class actions. 9 Although private securities litigation is an im-
portant supplement to the Securities and Exchange Commission's
enforcement role, it also provides opportunities for strike suits: weak
claims brought for their settlement value.' 0 The PSLRA implemented
a series of reforms to address this risk, including heightened pleading
requirements,11 a discovery stay prior to the resolution of a motion to
dismiss, 12 and a mandatory Rule 11 inquiry. 13 The Act also substan-
tially revised the lead plaintiff selection process.' 4
Prior to the PSLRA, courts typically chose class action lead plain-
tiffs on a first-come, first-serve basis.1 5 The first to file became class
representative.' 6 This resulted in a race to the courthouse, in which
claims were sometimes triggered by a drop in the defendant's stock
price, thus increasing the risk of nonmeritorious suits. 17 It also pro-
duced a largely lawyer-driven form of litigation in the securities class
action context. Lawyers sought out their client, not the other way
around.1 8 Class counsel would often make the important litigation de-
6. See infra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes Part V.
9. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
10. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-48 (1975) (describing the
dangers of "vexatious litigation" in private securities suits).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
12. See § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
13. See § 78u-4(c)(1).
14. See § 78u-4(a)(3)(B).
15. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institu-
tional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2062
(1995) ("Courts most often appoint as lead counsel the lawyer who files the first complaint.
Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers race to the courthouse." (internal quotation marks omitted)). As Weiss
and Beckerman note, courts also sometimes allowed lawyers who filed suits with the same or
similar claims to decide who should be appointed as lead counsel. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 2060.
18. See id. at 2060-61.
2008]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cisions-including those on settlement terms-with little outside
monitoring.
Commentators suggested that this ended in settlement values that
were lower than they might have been,' 9 with an overly large portion
of the recovery going to class counsel rather than class members.20 In
other words, there were substantial agency costs associated with the
attorney-client relationship.2'
Congress intended to rectify this agency cost problem by favoring
class representatives that were more capable of overseeing the case,
with stronger incentives to do so. 22 Prior to the PSLRA, an influential
article by Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman suggested that large insti-
tutional shareholders would be better suited to monitor securities
class action litigation than most individual investors.23 The PSLRA
lead plaintiff provisions reflected this idea by creating a presumption
in favor of plaintiffs with large holdings in the defendant's securities.
In theory, institutional plaintiffs offer several advantages. The size
of their holdings gives them a financial stake in the outcome of the
litigation. In addition, they have the necessary sophistication to
closely monitor decisions made by class counsel. Investment holdings
are also a relatively objective basis for plaintiff selection and may limit
the incentive to rush to the courthouse that resulted under a first-to-
file system.
Under the PSLRA, district courts must select a lead plaintiff that is
the "most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members. '24 The Act further creates a presumption that the plaintiff
that is most capable of adequately representing the class is the person
or group with "the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
class."'25 This presumption, in turn, may be rebutted "only upon proof
• . . that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff" does not meet
typicality or adequacy requirements. 26
Recent empirical studies suggest that the PSLRA functions as in-
tended, at least in terms of increasing the role of institutional investors
19. See Jill E. Fisch. Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel Under the PSLRA. 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 57 (Spring/Summer 2001).
20. See id.
21. For an analysis of the problem in agency cost terms, see Weiss & Beckerman, supra note
15, at 2064-88.
22. See Fisch, supra note 19. at 60-61 (reviewing the legislative history).
23. See generally Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 15.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
25. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).
26. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(l1).
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in securities class action litigation. 27 In other respects, the law has
produced unanticipated consequences-notably, the dominant role of
public pension funds as lead plaintiff participants. 28
However, it is still somewhat early to judge the success of the
PSLRA lead plaintiff provision. Initially, the PSLRA simply failed to
produce the anticipated shift toward institutional investors as lead
plaintiffs.29 Institutional investors were apparently uninterested in a
guiding role in securities class actions. For example, a 1997 study
found only 9 institutional lead plaintiffs out of 175 cases.30 But, sev-
eral years later, the litigation landscape looked quite different. One
study found that institutional investors comprised 51% of lead plain-
tiffs in 2002 and 42% of lead plaintiffs in 2003.31 Thus, empirical re-
search in recent years indicates dramatically different results from
earlier studies.
Despite the PSLRA's evolving impact, many institutions with large
securities holdings avoid securities class actions. Mutual funds, for ex-
ample, do not take advantage of the opportunities to become lead
plaintiffs.32 As noted, a subset of the institutional shareholder group
has acquired real importance in this context-public pension funds
27. For recent analyses of the impact of the PSLRA lead plaintiff provisions, see Stephen J.
Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); Stephen J. Choi & Robert B.
Thompson, Securities Litigation and its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the
PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489 (2006); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku,
Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1637-39 (2006); and Michael A. Perino. Markets and Monitors: The
Impact of Competition and Experience on Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions (St. John's
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0034, Jan. 2006). available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=870577.
28. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1609 (noting the absence of private institutional
investors serving as lead plaintiffs).
29. See Choi et al., supra note 27, at 877.
30. Id. (citing Elayne Demby, Ducking Lead Plaintiff Status (May 1999), available at http://
www.assetpub.com/archive/ps/99-psmay/may99PS58a.html).
31. Id. at 877-88 (citing PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2003 SECURITIES LITIGATION
STUDY 6 (2004), http://www.10b5.pwc.com/PDF/2003-study-final.pdf).
32. One study of recent settlements found "no settlement where a bank, mutual fund, or in-
surance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action." See Cox & Thomas,
supra note 27, at 1609; see also Choi et al., supra note 27, at 880 ("Mutual funds have failed to
participate in securities fraud litigation, at all, despite their substantial holdings."). Cf James D.
Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action
Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411. 413 (2005) (determining, based on a study of settlements, that
less than 30% of institutional investors with provable losses perfect their claims).
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are now common participants in private securities class actions.33 A
recent study suggests that the PSLRA's primary effect on institutional
investor participation is its effect on public pension funds. 34 For the
most part, private institutional investors have not served as lead
plaintiffs.
A predominance of public pension funds could be desirable. Public
pension fund plaintiffs correlate with higher value outcomes in securi-
ties class actions.35 On the other hand, it is unclear whether this result
is due to the ability of public pension funds to monitor the litigation.
The authors of one recent empirical study indicated that their results
could be due to pension fund cherry picking of the more significant
class actions.36 Nevertheless, the consequences of public pension fund
participation may be beneficial to the class; the ultimate impact of this
set of lead plaintiffs is yet to be determined.
A. Pay to Play and Agency Costs
The arrival of new candidates for class representative has also cre-
ated a new set of agency cost concerns. Hopefully, the lead plaintiff
and its counsel will largely share the goals of the class as a whole. But
this particular type of institutional shareholder displays unique fea-
tures. Public pension funds may be more susceptible to political con-
siderations, causing their interests to diverge from those of other class
members. 37 Perhaps of greater concern, there is evidence that some
of these lead plaintiffs have been subject to pay-to-play practices.
Critics fear that this development results in the selection of plain-
tiffs affected by pay-to-play schemes that distort class action monitor-
ing.38  In pay-to-play cases, plaintiffs' firms make significant
contributions to the individuals responsible for the pension fund's
choice of lead counsel. Unsurprisingly, pay-to-play practices raise
doubts whether such a pension fund will adequately supervise class
counsel.
James Cox, Randall Thomas, and Dana Kiku collected evidence
that suggests that the problem is not just hypothetical. As they note,
33. Another group of institutional investors with a significant presence are labor union pen-
sion funds. See Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471 (2008).
34. Choi et al., supra note 27, at 902.
35. Id. at 870.
36. See id.
37. See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 33.
38. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: A Gentle Critique of the Third Circuit
Task Force Report, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 805, 809-10 (2001); Cox & Thomas. supra note 27, at
1611-14.
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such payments are "not well regulated. '39 Moreover, such cases cre-
ate skepticism that the resulting lead plaintiff will be an active
monitor.
In In re Cendant Corp. Litigation, for example, New York State
Comptroller H. Carl McCall was responsible for selecting counsel for
the New York State Common Retirement Fund.40 He received
$100,000 in campaign contributions from three plaintiffs' firms from
1999 to 2001-the time period for selecting counsel in Cendant.41 Two
of these firms were selected as counsel.42 The attorneys' fee was $55
million.43 It was estimated that, in 2002, these two firms, their part-
ners, and their families donated nearly $200,000 to McCall. 44
As Cox and Thomas explain, Cendant is not the sole cause for con-
cern. For example, the Milberg Weiss firm, a dominant player in se-
curities class actions, allegedly paid to obtain a lead counsel position. 45
Campaign contributions from law firms in one state to public officials
that are elected in other states have also raised questions. 46 Further-
more, there are indications that plaintiffs' firms have begun hiring lob-
byists to assist in attaining a lead counsel selection.47
There is nothing wrong with an institutional investor plaintiff devel-
oping long-term relations with law firms for securities class action
work. A law firm that works well with an institutional investor may
enable that client to monitor the litigation more efficiently, which ulti-
mately benefits the class.48 However, to the extent that the initial hir-
ing is the product of a pay-to-play scheme, development of repeat
transactions could be less desirable. It may create a relationship
where lead counsel is the true party in interest, with an agreeable,
passive client. 49
39. Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1614.
40. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001); Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1611.
41. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1611.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1611-12.
45. Id. at 1612.
46. Id. at 1613-14.
47. Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1613 ("[W]e were informed by several public pension
fund officials that at least some of these lobbyists are engaged in efforts to persuade funds to
assume the lead plaintiff position in securities fraud class actions and retain the law firm to act as
lead counsel.").
48. Cf. Fisch, supra note 19, at 92 (suggesting that the lead plaintiff cannot "be expected to
monitor court-appointed counsel effectively, absent control over counsel's compensation in the
case at bar and the potential for repeat business in comparable cases").
49. As John Coffee explains, "[a]lthough law firms may be agents to their clients in theory, the
reality is that 'pay-to-play practices' allow them to become de facto principals and to acquire
control over a given jurisdiction's pension fund." Coffee, Jr., supra note 38, at 809-10.
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B. Judicial Refinements of the Lead Plaintiff and
Lead Counsel Selection Process
If Congress ultimately revisits the PSLRA, pay to play is not the
only development worthy of review. In addition, Congress should
consider the growing number of suggestions to further refine the
PSLRA's terms. For example, post-PSLRA courts have adopted a va-
riety of approaches to lead plaintiff selection. Lower courts' exper-
iences with lead plaintiff and lead counsel selection techniques have
thus led to additional reform ideas.
Subsequent to the PSLRA, lower courts developed methods for re-
sponding to agency costs that are not expressly described in the
PSLRA. Certain courts have used lead counsel auctions as a method
to address attorneys' fee concerns. 50 Courts have also permitted ag-
gregation of plaintiffs into groups for purposes of assessing the finan-
cial stake of would-be lead plaintiffs.51
The merits of these PSLRA interpretations are controversial. Some
scholars have suggested, on policy grounds, that courts should use auc-
tions to address lead counsel selection. 52 Yet it does not appear that
the current statute permits this option.5 3 Even if the statute did per-
mit auctions, scholars have also questioned their use on policy
grounds.54 It is unclear whether these variations on the conventional
lead plaintiff or counsel selection process generate net costs or bene-
fits. Each merits a closer look.
1. Aggregation
As noted, one post-PSLRA development is the use of lead plaintiff
groups. The PSLRA states that courts should "adopt a presumption
that the most adequate plaintiff ... is the person or group of persons
that . . .has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
class."' 55 Certain courts interpret this language to permit small, cohe-
50. See, e.g., In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000). An
important pre-PSLRA example is In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal.
1990).
51. See, e.g., Aronson v. McKesson HBOC. Inc.. 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (describing different judicial approaches to aggregation).
52. See James L. Tuxbury, A Case for Competitive Bidding for Lead Counsel in Securities Class
Actions, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 285 (suggesting an amendment to the PSLRA to permit
auctions for lead counsel).
53. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[n]othing in our pre-
Reform Act jurisprudence gives the district court the sweeping authority to deny a plaintiff the
status of class representative because the court disagrees with his choice of counsel, and nothing
in the Reform Act adds such a power").
54. See Fisch. supra note 19, at 91-95.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(1) (2000).
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sive groups of investors to serve in a lead plaintiff capacity, while
other courts allow large, unrelated groups of investors to act as the
lead plaintiff.56 This aggregation has proven controversial.
A major concern with aggregation is that it may limit the ability of
the lead plaintiff to monitor class counsel. As Jill Fisch notes, "[a]
collection of unrelated individuals cannot effectively exercise client
control. ' 57 "Group decisionmaking is... less efficient than individual
decisionmaking" and suffers from collective action problems.5 8 Law-
yers may also select the group members, which contradicts the
PSLRA concept that investors should control the litigation.
Despite these considerations, aggregation may still result in higher
awards. In a recent empirical study, Cox and Thomas conclude that
"groups perform better than individuals as lead plaintiffs in larger
cases, while groups that include an entity yield larger settlements and
greater provable loss ratios than those that occur with mere aggrega-
tion of individuals. ' 59 These results were unanticipated. To the con-
trary, commentators were skeptical of aggregation as a lead plaintiff
selection method. 60
It is certainly plausible, based on the legislative history, that Con-
gress did not intend aggregation in the form recognized by several
courts. Without a limiting factor, thousands of plaintiffs could be
joined into a single plaintiff group, producing results quite unlike the
institutional investor model that Congress intended under the
PSLRA. 61 The policy arguments against aggregation are also reasona-
ble. However, the empirical data thus far have not demonstrated that
aggregation is an undesirable practice, and the study by Cox and
Thomas should encourage further inquiry.62
2. Lead Counsel Actions
Another potential means to address agency cost concerns for securi-
ties class actions is the lead counsel auction. Under this practice, the
court creates an auction for lead counsel based upon the fee structure
and other factors the court considers relevant. In 2006, a bill in the
56. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 65-66 (describing the case law regarding aggregation).
57. Id. at 71.
58. ld.: accord Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1617 (noting the collective action problem
faced by aggregated plaintiffs seeking to monitor class counsel).
59. Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1638-39.
60. See id.
61. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 67 (noting the possibility of very large plaintiff groups).
62. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27.
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House of Representatives sought to expressly permit the use of lead
counsel auctions.63
A perceived advantage of an auction method is the objective nature
of the process.64 Courts need not subjectively judge what counsel and
fee arrangements would be ideal. In theory, an auction allows for
lower attorneys' fees, benefiting the class by permitting it to obtain a
larger share of an ultimate damages award. Notably, this choice could
limit the incentives for pay-to-play activity, because the lead plaintiff
would not have sole discretion over its choice of counsel.
Yet commentators have pointed out a variety of problems with the
lead counsel auction process. The auction system does not truly repli-
cate market forces.65 For example, in the ordinary world of counsel
selection, a client will not be solely concerned with the price of the
attorney's fee. 66 The quality of the legal representation is also impor-
tant.67 The competitive bidding process is unlikely to take full account
of qualitative distinctions, such as the counsel's fit with the case or
interaction with the plaintiff, instead emphasizing counsel's price.
Further, auctions may harm the class, even in cases where qualitative
dimensions are identical among participants. 68 The risk is that the fee
structure will fall below the optimal level needed to provide counsel
with appropriate litigation incentives.
Other concerns include the issue of judicial impartiality. A court's
involvement in counsel selection and fee arrangement may impact its
assessment of the litigation.69 It is also possible that the institutional
investors that the PSLRA seeks to encourage will not wish to partici-
63. H.R. 5491, 109th Cong. (2006).
64. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 80-81 ("[Clourts that have experimented with auctions in
securities litigation seem to be motivated by the possibility that an auction will provide a more
objective way of selecting lead counsel and a better way of determining an appropriate fee
award.").
65. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel
by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 672 (2002). "[Aluctions do not simply replicate the mar-
ket" but, instead, are a "stylized process for addressing two problems that contribute to market
failure: lack of information and inadequate competition." Id. It should be noted that other
types of auction may avoid standard critiques of the lead counsel auction process. For an exam-
ple of an alternative auction approach, see Silver & Dinkin, supra note 33, at 488.
66. See Fisch, supra note 19. at 83 (noting that the auction process's emphasis on price is
inconsistent with this feature of the market for legal services).
67. See id.
68. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead
Counsel, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (2002).
69. See Fisch, supra note 19. at 95 ("[Tihe court's selection of counsel, which includes a deter-
mination that counsel is qualified and has made a reasonable evaluation of the case, may create
an unintentional bias that the defendant cannot overcome.").
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pate on these terms.70 For that matter, the attorney-client relationship
may suffer. 71 Lead plaintiffs that do not have a preexisting relation-
ship with their class counsel may be less successful monitors.
Despite these concerns, recent empirical analysis of auctions sug-
gests that the auction process may be less troubing than its critics have
anticipated. This is not to say that auctions are successful, as the sam-
ple size for assessing lead counsel auctions is limited. Nevertheless,
auctions may lower attorneys' fees without negative effects on settle-
ment value.
Michael Perino recently studied the effects of lead counsel auctions,
and his tentative conclusion is that they can be beneficial, especially in
cases where public pension funds are not selected as the lead plain-
tiff.72 Perino suggests that there is a significant correlation between
the use of auctions and lower attorneys' fees. 73 Whether auctions are
otherwise harmful is another matter. The ability to reach more cer-
tain conclusions is limited. Based on interpretation of the PSLRA,
several courts have expressed skepticism regarding the auction pro-
cess.74 Accordingly, adequately assessing the merits of counsel auc-
tions under the current legal framework may prove difficult.
C. Reform Proposals
Courts are not the only source of potential reform ideas. In light of
the post-PSLRA results, commentators have also suggested a variety
of reforms to the lead plaintiff selection process. Some of these re-
forms target specific practices, such as pay to play. Others are aimed
at improving the monitoring role of the lead plaintiff. For example,
several proposals seek to increase the likelihood that private institu-
tional investors will serve in a lead plaintiff capacity. A brief overview
of these suggestions follows.
Cox and Thomas suggest that a plaintiff group's monitoring ability
may be positively correlated to the largest group member's financial
stake in the lawsuit. 75 They propose that, when a court compares
competing groups, "the relative inquiry should not be which group has
70. Id. at 93 (suggesting that institutional investors may not wish to serve as lead plaintiffs if
they did not receive their choice of counsel).
71. Id. at 92 ("The lead plaintiff cannot be expected to develop a close working relationship
with a lawyer appointed by the court.").
72. See Perino, supra note 27, at 26.
73. Id. at 33.
74. See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,
264 F.3d 201, 279-80 (3rd Cir. 2001).
75. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1639. Cox and Thomas note that they have not
tested this hypothesis.
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the largest financial loss but rather the relative size of the financial
loss suffered by the biggest owner in each group. ' 76 Their suggestion,
however, does not track the language of the PSLRA, which fails to
distinguish between members within a group. Consideration of the
largest owner within a group may be good policy, but it is not specified
by the presumption set forth in the statutory text.
Another type of reform would increase the lead plaintiff's compen-
sation for litigation costs. One possibility, also suggested by Cox and
Thomas, would provide for the award of indirect costs experienced by
the lead plaintiff, rather than just direct costs like the expense of dep-
osition time. 77 This change might encourage greater involvement of
institutional investors. An alternative, suggested by Perino, proposes
that courts allocate a larger share of cost savings to lead plaintiffs,
based on negotiating lower attorneys' fees.78
Silver and Dinkin offer several different options. They also seek to
improve institutional investor incentives, but through a substantial
lead plaintiff bonus. 79 One proposed method would tie lead plaintiff
bonuses to the size of their securities holdings. 80 Another method
would offer 20% of the eventual recovery to the class member willing
to pay the most for lead plaintiff status.81 Under this proposal, the
lead plaintiff would pay half of the class attorneys' fees from this bo-
nus. A third method would raise the bonus level to 30%, but the lead
plaintiff would have to pay all of the attorneys' fees from this bonus. 82
Additionally, disclosure reforms could target the existence of pay-
to-play relationships. Courts might require attorneys to disclose cam-
paign contributions to those who control the public pension fund.
Further, a positive disclosure might have consequences attached.
John Coffee, for example, argues that a pension fund's choice of coun-
sel should be disqualified if the law firm or its partners "contributed to
the campaign of any elected official administering or holding substan-
tial influence over the fund."'83
A final issue is how to implement such reforms. Cox and Thomas
suggest that "courts should be more willing, indeed activist, in award-
ing costs to institutional lead plaintiffs for all expenses related to an
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1637.
78. See Perino, supra note 27, at 31.
79. See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 33, at 488.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Coffee, Jr., supra note 38, at 810.
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institution's participation as a lead plaintiff. '8 4 Perino, in contrast, in-
dicates that his proposed reform would require legislative action, and
Silver and Dinkin also suggest statutory amendments.8 5 Again, addi-
tional legislative guidance could be useful in this area, as courts may
be constrained by existing statutory language.
III. ALLOCATING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR JUDICIAL EXPERIMENTATION
Each of these reforms, or some combination, has the potential to
address agency costs for securities class actions. But these reforms
could also be harmful or, at least, less desirable than other, untried
alternatives. Given the large number of affected parties with distinct
interests, predicting outcomes is difficult.
For example, Coffee's suggestion of law firm disqualification based
on political contributions sounds like a useful way of staving off pay-
to-play practices. The added risks associated with political contribu-
tions could drive off law firms that seek to effectively purchase the
lead counsel role. With sufficiently strong penalties where pay-to-play
activities come to light, the practice may vanish. Alternatively, the
pay-to-play practice may continue to flourish, but become less visible
to courts. Only implementation of this plan would determine its true
effect upon agency costs.
Silver and Dinkin argue that such disclosure-based proposals could
backfire, assuming that they actually eliminate pay to play:
[Tihese measures would remove the cloud that presently hangs over
public sector and union funds .... By eliminating the selective in-
centives political contributions provide, they might reduce the rate
at which public sector and union funds volunteer as lead plaintiffs,
restoring the status quo that existed prior to the PSLRA, in which
individual investors led the vast majority of cases.86
If the current post-PSLRA environment is an improvement over the
pre-PSLRA environment, it is far from clear that removing public
pension funds and labor unions from the mix would be helpful.
If the original goals of the PSLRA are to be met in full, reform is
desirable. Yet it is hard to determine which reforms will succeed. Re-
forms may not turn out to be improvements once implemented. A
successful effort to remove pay-to-play practices could produce a di-
minished pool of institutional lead plaintiffs, while a monetary incen-
tive to serve as lead plaintiff could diminish the class's award without
84. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1637 (emphasis in original).
85. See Perino, supra note 27, at 31; Silver & Dinkin, supra note 33.
86. Silver & Dinkin, supra note 33, at 506.
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attracting the desired institutional investors. 87 On the other hand, ag-
gregation and auctions may have all the negative effects their critics
describe, yet empirical data suggest that they may be beneficial.
It could also be hard to assess these costs and benefits even after a
PSLRA revision. For instance, much of the interaction between attor-
neys and lead plaintiffs is invisible to outside parties. Additionally, an
across-the-board reform may preclude a comparison with the effects
of alternative reform proposals.
A. PSLRA Reform as an Institutional Question
In light of this backdrop, a legislated rule has different implications
from a delegation to the judiciary. The choice of decision-making au-
thority raises a significant institutional question. Given the PSLRA's
apparent effects, what institution is best suited to implement further
adjustments to lead plaintiff or lead counsel selection?
Determining the best means of reform requires a comparative insti-
tutional analysis.88 If the goal is to produce the most efficient solution
to the agency-cost problem, then it is not enough to merely focus on
the courts' blind spots or the idiosyncrasies of attorney-client relation-
ships. Likewise, comparison of one plaintiff category with another
provides insufficient information, especially given the tendency of pri-
vate institutions to avoid this type of litigation altogether. The lead
plaintiff selection process implicates the combined role of several legal
institutions, including the courts, the legislature, and the legal services
market.
As is often the case when comparing institutions as a source of reg-
ulation, the analysis is complex. One participant may impact others in
unanticipated ways. Lead plaintiffs, plaintiffs' attorneys, and defend-
ants may each alter their actions in light of the roles courts and legisla-
tures adopt. Accordingly, a good rule for the current litigation
context could be a poor fit for later scenarios.
An interesting feature of the lead plaintiff selection process is that
each available institution is poorly equipped to resolve agency-cost
concerns in a way that still provides for quality legal counsel. Courts
suffer from cognitive biases and are unable to assimilate much of the
87. The lack of interest in being lead plaintiff among private institutional investors is pro-
nounced. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 27, at 1609-10 (suggesting potential reasons for this
reluctance).
88. For an informative discussion of such institutional comparisons, see generally NEAL K.
KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS
(2001); and NEAL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW.
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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information important to lead plaintiff policy.8 9 The judiciary is not
always well suited to apply social science research. Legislatures are
unable to address the nuances of particular cases and may react slowly
when the lead plaintiff selection process is distorted by such factors as
pay to play. In addition, market forces may have unexpected effects
given the regulatory context.
It is unlikely that courts or legislatures have discovered the best
combination of participants and incentives to address the lead plaintiff
conundrum. In part, this is the product of a limited-and still chang-
ing-set of empirical data. The role of institutional plaintiffs today is
different from ten years ago, and the ultimate effects of the PSLRA
remain unclear. Even if the impact of the PSLRA stabilizes and be-
comes clear, it will be hard to assess how well an alternative approach
would have worked in comparison. Given the lack of transparency, it
may always be hard to measure the full effects of the various influ-
ences on class representation.
Some institution must decide whether auctions are appropriate or
whether to permit aggregation into plaintiff groups. Unfortunately,
the effect of these methods is highly uncertain. For example, critics
have cogent arguments against auctions, but these arguments are
based on undemonstrated assumptions about how auctions would
function.90 At present, the empirical data do not indicate that lead
plaintiff auctions are harmful or that aggregation detracts from the
interests of the class.91
There are two common approaches to addressing these types of
concern. One is for the legislature to set out rules or standards that
courts must implement. This is a top-down measure effectively repre-
sented by the PSLRA. The bottom-up approach, on the other hand,
89. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
933 (2006) (discussing distinctions between courts and legislatures when addressing disputes); see
also Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CM. L. REV. 883 (2006) (critiquing
common law adjudication).
90. See Perino, supra note 27, at 33 ("[T]here is at this point too little experience with auctions
to draw definitive conclusions about whether the problems that critics have identified in theory
will in fact exist.").
91. It would be helpful to know more about the effects of these practices:
[Clourts should continue to experiment with auctioning the role of lead counsel, at
least as a second-best solution in those cases in which public pension funds do not
participate and in which the available lead plaintiffs do not appear to have used compe-
tition or otherwise to have engaged in arm's length bargaining to select class counsel.
Id.; see also Tuxbury, supra note 52, at 333-34 ("Since a movement towards some type of com-
petitive bidding or increased judicial discretion in the selection of class counsel is occurring in
class actions in general, now is not the time to close the door on competitive bidding in securities
class actions.").
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would allow courts to gradually develop answers through case-by-case
adjudication. 92 Should courts have that option?
While it is hard to choose among these approaches with complete
confidence, it is significant that the consequences of the PSLRA lead
plaintiff provision are equivocal and that the impact of the several
reform proposals is hard to determine ex ante. There is a developing
sense that the statute does not produce the lead plaintiff type in-
tended. With a high risk of error, it therefore makes sense for policy-
makers to implement tentative changes in a decentralized fashion. A
bottom-up, judicially crafted approach could be a mistake-certainly
the race to the courthouse prior to the PSLRA was undesirable-but
refinement of the PSLRA could also benefit from gradualism.
Before looking further at this issue, however, it is important to de-
termine whether judicial experimentation is an option under current
law. If courts may opt for the suggested reforms without legislative
change to the PSLRA, it would be unnecessary to amend the securi-
ties laws.
B. Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Flexibility
In one sense, judge-made law is flexible, regardless of the statutory
setting. Much statutory language is indeterminate or ambiguous. In
addition, judicial understandings of a statute often change over time,
thus resembling common-law adjudication. But judicial readings of
statutes do not "work themselves pure" in the way that the common
law sometimes does. 93 To the extent that judges are bound to a legis-
lative choice, courts are not as free to make new law when reading
statutes as they are when developing common-law doctrine.
Occasionally, courts reconsider statutory interpretation precedents
when it becomes clear that a prior holding rested on an incomplete
understanding of empirical realities.94 In such cases, the court's un-
derstanding of a statute's meaning may be left unchanged at a high
92. See generally Rachlinski, supra note 89 (discussing the respective advantages of top-down
and bottom-up approaches to law making). An alternative would be to rely on administrative
agencies. For the most part, however, the primary sources of amendment to the law governing
private securities litigation are Congress and the judiciary. This Article focuses on these two
institutions, but it should be recognized that the SEC could also contribute.
93. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4,
28-29 (1998) (describing how the Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes does not create
"much real common law" but resembles the common law in the sense that it includes judge-
made law and relies on case-by-case development). Of course, it is debatable whether the com-
mon law does work itself pure. See Schauer, supra note 89, at 906-11.
94. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (re-
jecting a per se rule against vertical price fixing under the Sherman Act based upon the potential
for both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects).
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level of generality, but the application of that meaning to concrete fact
patterns becomes substantially different. Courts sometimes also re-
consider their prior holdings for normative reasons. The power to
overrule or distinguish prior decisions allows for substantial revisions
of judge-made law. 95 Courts may rethink the meaning of a statutory
text, perhaps based upon the negative consequences of the old reading
or a shift in interpretive philosophy.
Taking these practices a step further, some commentators argue
that courts should engage in dynamic statutory interpretation. 96 A
theory of dynamic statutory interpretation suggests that a statute's
meaning changes over time and that courts should take such changes
into account. Depending on one's view of language and the judici-
ary's role, this type of interpretation may provide judicial flexibility
when an old reading of a statute becomes obsolete. But the legitimacy
of dynamic interpretation remains unsettled.97 Although dynamic in-
terpretation has its adherents, it is not the dominant strain of statutory
interpretation among judges.
Conventional judicial understandings of statutory interpretation fall
into standard categories. They generally look to several sources of
meaning: the statutory text as it would be understood by a competent
reader (textualism); Congress's intent in enacting a statute (intention-
alism); or the statute's apparent purpose (purposivism). 98 These inter-
pretive theories provide judges with varying degrees of flexibility, but
tend to constrain statutory interpretation in ways that the common
law would not constrain judicial law making. Whichever interpretive
method is followed, when stare decisis is added to the picture, statu-
tory understandings acquire a certain fixity.
As a policy matter, there are circumstances where it could be bene-
ficial if judges were able to try out a variety of statutory choices. The
95. Distinguishing and overruling allow judges to make law in different ways, under different
constraints. For a helpful discussion of the distinctions between judicial overruling and distin-
guishing of precedent, see JOSEPH RAZ, Law and Value in Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 183-92 (1979).
96. For a thorough explanation and defense of dynamic statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
97. Textualist judges, for example, reject the idea of dynamic statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22
(1997) (critiquing William Eskridge's dynamic theory of statutory interpretation). For a recent
institution-based critique of dynamic statutory interpretation, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 46-50 (2006).
98. For analysis of the distinctions between textualism and intentionalism, see Andrew S.
Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener's Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25,
41-52 (2006). For analysis of the distinctions between textualism and purposivism, see generally
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
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selection of lead plaintiffs for securities class actions plausibly fits this
category. Assuming that the statutory language is sufficiently indeter-
minate, the most efficient means to reform the lead plaintiff selection
process might be for courts to experiment with such measures as auc-
tions or aggregation in response to practices like pay to play. If so,
there would be no need for the legislature to amend the statute itself.
The idea of judicial experimentation in statutory or constitutional
interpretation has been proposed in other contexts. 99 For example,
Michael Dorf suggests that judicial experimentation should be consid-
ered as an alternative to textualism and purposivism when courts read
statutes. 100 He argues that courts could reach provisional adjudicative
results. A judicial determination of this sort would be understood as a
temporary solution to a problem, subject to limited stare decisis
protection.101
The potential benefits of this approach for lead plaintiff selection
are significant. Courts may jettison a poorly functioning selection
technique. A reasonable alternative can be compared to other op-
tions and further refined over time. Courts might adjust their statu-
tory interpretations in response to behavior changes among the
relevant parties to litigation, altering applicable rules and standards as
they affect the regulatory environment. In the process, courts would
be able to acquire valuable experience with each plaintiff selection
method.
From a consequentialist perspective, judicial experimentation could
also have substantial negatives. There is some question whether pro-
visional interpretations would erode judicial legitimacy. 10 2 Provisional
decisions look more like the actions of administrative agencies than
judges, and the lack of finality when a court establishes a legal out-
come could lower the esteem with which parties hold judicial prece-
99. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875 (2003).
100. See Dorf. supra note 93, at 7-8 (suggesting that both textualism and purposivism have
affinities with the case-by-case, common-law method and that this method does not provide
adequate means for adjusting legal doctrine); id. at 9 (suggesting that courts could construct a
"model of provisional adjudication" (emphasis in original)).
101. See id. at 73 (suggesting that the Supreme Court could "designate some doctrines or
decisions as provisional, promising to revisit these matters at some future date"); see also Dorf,
supra note 99, at 969 (suggesting that courts might "resolv[e] a legal question for the time being,
subject to being overruled on something less than the standard ordinarily required to depart
from stare decisis should experience demonstrate a superior solution").
102. Dorf, supra note 99. at 947 (noting the concern that "[olnce courts become active prob-
lem-solvers enmeshed in the messy business of ordering real-world institutions, they will no
longer be perceived as neutral").
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dents. 10 3 In addition, the stability of legal doctrine is an important
value. Transition costs can be high when legal rules shift. 10 4 Firms
may not seek lead plaintiff status if they are uncertain which approach
a court will use.
Granting these concerns, an experimental approach to the PSLRA
lead plaintiff selection process might enable courts to more effectively
select the plaintiff best suited to oversee the litigation and would have
a more fact-specific perspective than a broad legislative rule. Courts
could plausibly work toward an improved response to agency cost
concerns by refining the lead plaintiff selection process over time, tak-
ing into account attorneys' fee considerations, counsel incentives, and
other issues that may arise as the various actors adjust to different
legal approaches. To a limited degree, this is already occurring.
C. The Conceptual Objection to Judicial Experimentation
Putting to one side the merits of judicial experimentation as a policy
matter, proponents of this technique face real conceptual challenges.
Judges are not necessarily free to undertake this approach. As Dorf
notes, "[s]o long as the Court conceives of its role as finding the mean-
ing of constitutional and statutory provisions, the notion of experi-
mentation and provisional adjudication will be tinged with
illegitimacy."10 5 For many courts, a statutory text that has received a
particular reading is decisive, even if it is indeterminate on the mar-
gins. Provisional holdings suggest that a court is not really saying
what the law is when it interprets the text.
This challenge to an experimental approach would readily apply to
the PSLRA. The difficulty with testing different approaches to the
lead plaintiff selection process is that Congress's guidance in the
PSLRA simply does not provide for this degree of judicial choice.
The statute creates a straightforward presumption in favor of the in-
vestor with the largest holding. The courts, quite appropriately, take
the PSLRA's text into account. Judicial precedents are closing off dis-
trict court discretion as it relates to lead counsel auctions and, in some
instances, plaintiff aggregation. 10 6
103. Id. at 948 (noting that the traditionalists may question "what makes a problem-solving
court a court rather than an (admittedly newfangled) administrative agency superintended by a
person wearing a robe?" (emphasis in original)).
104. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789 (2002)
(discussing the import of legal transition costs).
105. See Dorf, supra note 93, at 71.
106. For a discussion of negative judicial responses to lead counsel auctions, see Tuxbury,
supra note 52, at 323-37. For a discussion of the varying judicial responses to aggregation, see
Fisch, supra note 19, at 65-66.
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Consider In re Cavanaugh, a case in which the Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed the lead plaintiff presumption and indicated its disapproval of
auctions under the PSLRA. 0 7 In that case, the district court refused
to give the Cavanaugh plaintiff group the full benefit of the PSLRA's
presumption based on the size of the group's financial stake.1 08 The
district court concluded that the presumption was "an effort by Con-
gress to encourage the involvement of institutional investors in securi-
ties class actions" and noted that the Cavanaugh group did not include
institutional investors.10 9 Accordingly, the district court limited the
effect of the PSLRA lead plaintiff presumption, treating it as merely
an "important element" of its decision.110 As a result, the district
court linked class counsel fees to its selection of the lead plaintiff." I
Judge Kozinski, writing for the panel, overturned the lower court's
determinations. He explains as follows:
Congress enacts statutes, not purposes, and courts may not depart
from the statutory text because they believe some other arrange-
ment would better serve the legislative goals. Here, the Reform Act
provides in categorical terms that the only basis on which a court
may compare plaintiffs competing to serve as lead is the size of their
financial stake in the controversy.' 12
According to the Ninth Circuit, the statute precluded the district
court's reasoning. Assuming that such a plaintiff meets the PSLRA's
financial stake requirement, "the court must appoint that plaintiff as
lead, unless it finds that he does not satisfy the typicality or adequacy
requirements."'" 3 The Ninth Circuit pointedly critiqued the use of
auctions for class counsel, emphasizing that the PSLRA leaves the
choice of class counsel "in the hands of the lead plaintiff."" 4
Decisions like Cavanaugh constrain the availability of new ap-
proaches to selecting the best lead plaintiff or lead counsel. Such deci-
sions are also reasonable statutory interpretations, and it is entirely
appropriate for judges to reach such holdings given the existing statu-
tory limits. It could, nevertheless, be desirable for courts to test differ-
ent methods for selecting lead plaintiffs and their counsel. Courts
may not be in a position to choose provisional adjudication under the
107. 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).
108. See In re Quintus Sec. Litig.. 201 F.R.D. 475, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
109. See id.
110. See In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967. 972 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
111. See id.
112. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 731-32 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 732.
114. Id. at 734 & n.14.
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current statutory framework, but Congress might enable courts to
innovate.
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
As empirical data are collected and studied, the evidence invites
policymakers to reassess aggregation, auctions, and other options to
refine the lead plaintiff selection process. Yet the available empirical
data are limited respecting these techniques, and it is also unclear that
better data will be forthcoming. Over time, courts may actually pro-
duce less useful data. As noted, courts have called the lead counsel
auction into question on the basis that the PSLRA precludes the prac-
tice, and the broader forms of aggregation have not always fared well.
Courts should hesitate before engaging in provisional adjudication
against the current statutory backdrop. 1 5 Moreover, many courts will
be unwilling to experiment, even if doing so would produce desirable
results. Instead of relying upon judicial initiative, Congress might ex-
plicitly empower judicial experimentation within certain established
parameters. Congress should revise the PSLRA to permit judicial ex-
perimentation regarding lead plaintiff selection, with the restriction
that this adjudication be informed by legislatively determined factors.
Legislative guidelines should include the PSLRA's current empha-
sis on lead plaintiffs' financial stakes, as this feature increases the odds
of a lead plaintiff that actively monitors the case. Courts should also
be permitted to consider the apparent ability of the lead plaintiff to
monitor the litigation; the potential relevance of the lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel, including the fee arrangement; and any evidence
that there is a pay-to-play arrangement or corruption of the process.
Lead counsel auctions should be allowed, but not mandated.
In other words, the agency cost concerns that motivated Congress
when enacting the PSLRA-those identified by Weiss and Becker-
man-should serve as factors for courts selecting a lead plaintiff. An
express legislative endorsement of this approach would not be a radi-
cal shift. The original Weiss and Beckerman article called for an ac-
115. This is not just because of the question of legitimacy in cases where the legislature has
not endorsed judicial experimentation. In addition, provisional adjudication may be beneficial
in one context and harmful in another. On a system-wide scale, it might be far better for the
judiciary to avoid the practice altogether than to encourage individual judges to adopt this ap-
proach on an ad hoc basis. Once judges feel free to choose experimental approaches. the prac-
tice may be misused, or at least poorly exercised. Cf. VERMEULE. supra note 97. at 166 (noting
that "it is itself an empirical question of interpretive choice whether the costs of instability,
disuniformity, and repeated decision and reevaluation imposed by [provisional adjudication and
decentralization] are worth the information obtained").
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tive judiciary as the means to address agency costs. 1 16 The judiciary
already engages in some experimentation, albeit within the awkward
confines of a statute that does not support a provisional approach.
Congress should now invite additional judicial efforts to this end.
Hopefully, this suggestion avoids the nirvana fallacy and does not
take an overly optimistic view of judicial acts.' 17 There is little cause
to think that the judiciary is an ideal institution for addressing agency
costs in class action litigation.118 Courts might do a poor job of mak-
ing lead plaintiff selections as a result of bounded rationality, cogni-
tive bias, institutional inertia, or other influences.' 19 They are also not
skilled at gathering and analyzing large-scale empirical data. 20 Even
if biases are removed, courts may not learn if their efforts produce a
poor attorney-client relationship in individual cases.
Courts are unlikely to see a complete picture of the quality of legal
representation behind the scenes. They can recognize incompetent
counsel, but it is hard for them to know when a shift in the lead plain-
tiff or lead counsel selection procedure produces subtle changes in le-
gal strategy. Would a legal argument have been marginally better but
for the limits on counsel fees produced by an auction? Did some sort
of quid pro quo occur unbeknownst to the court? Despite these un-
certainties, however, it is plausible that, over time, experienced courts
will be able to determine when one method works better than
another.
Legislatures have their own foibles. Congress may be more likely
to respond to a serious problem with the lead plaintiff process than
courts, but Congress may also be more limited in its ability to respond
in a nuanced way to changes in the way securities cases are litigated.
Congress also has different information sources from courts. Judges
see the specifics of actual litigation. Lobbying may reflect legitimate
116. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 15, at 2127 ("The first steps, however, must be taken
by the courts. A federal district judge acting sua sponte in some given class action could adopt
the practices we propose relating to selection of lead counsel ....").
117. See VERMEULE. supra note 97, at 41 ("A familiar shorthand for asymmetrical institution-
alism is the nirvana fallacy, in which an excessively optimistic account of one institution is com-
pared with an excessively pessimistic account of another.").
118. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 94 (noting that "[tihe legislative history of the PSLRA re-
flects congressional frustration over many attributes of the litigation system that developed
under judicial oversight").
119. Id. at 94-95. "The pressures imposed by limited resources and crowded dockets" have
made courts more managerial. Id. Thus, in class actions, "judges have extensive power to dic-
tate the litigation process and results, [and] there is a risk that they will use this power in a
manner that does not reflect the best interests of the plaintiff class." Id.
120. See Dorf, supra note 93, at 53 (noting that "generalist judges simply cannot keep up with
the latest developments in all of the fields relevant to their work").
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concerns with flaws in the judicial system, but could also reflect inter-
ests unrelated to the agency cost problems of securities class action
representation.
Presumably, some courts could perform well in this capacity and
build experience in the area. They may adapt their plaintiff selection
procedures over time in response to the changing behavior of the rele-
vant actors. Furthermore, potential lead plaintiffs and their law firms
will have an incentive to notify the court of flaws in established selec-
tion methods. Whether or not litigants' objections would be reliable,
courts could at least attempt to minimize the risks of specific weak-
nesses in their chosen approach. 121
The most important feature of a judicial response could be the in-
formation it provides. In the end, the current empirical data show
that we need more empirical data. Decentralized adjudication across
different federal circuits allows for a comparative analysis of selection
processes. To the extent that this produces useful information, it
would assist Congress if it becomes necessary to revisit lead plaintiff
selection procedures. For this reason, judicial experimentation would
be a valuable addition to the lead plaintiff selection process, at the
least as an interim approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The current lead plaintiff selection process improves upon the pre-
PSLRA system. However, it raises concerns about pay-to-play distor-
tions. In addition, there is empirical evidence that suggests room for
further refinements to the statute. Requiring disclosures when coun-
sel has made political contributions to pension fund managers is a sen-
sible revision to the law. But it may be that additional reforms would
also assist in aligning the interests of lead plaintiffs and their counsel
more fully with the class as a whole.
The record under the PSLRA shows a good deal of flux. The par-
ticipation of institutional lead plaintiffs in the first few years after en-
actment was quite different from participation today. Perhaps the
data will dramatically change in a few years. The prosecution of Mil-
berg Weiss suggests major alterations in the lead counsel market. In
addition, some of the current data were unanticipated. For example,
the impact of aggregation runs contrary to commentators' predictions.
The effects of future reforms could be equally surprising.
121. Notice, for example, that the auction process has changed over the years as courts grew
more sophisticated in using the technique. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 82-86 (describing the
evolution of the auction process and noting the strengths and weaknesses of different auction
approaches).
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A more complete data set could better enable Congress or courts to
decide how best to select lead plaintiffs and offer insights into how the
choice of lead counsel should relate to the lead plaintiff question.
Which variations on the basic lead plaintiff selection process would be
worthwhile, or most worthwhile, is unknown. It would be useful to
test some of the proposed reforms. As written, however, the PSLRA
limits the available judicial options, especially where courts have
adopted a textualist mode of statutory interpretation. Ultimately, the
ideal allocation of legislative and judicial decision-making authority
over these issues is hard to pinpoint. Despite the uncertainties, one
need not generally favor courts over legislatures to see the advantages
of increasing judicial discretion in the present context.
Without question, courts are imperfect when it comes to making
decisions regarding lead plaintiffs. Legislatures also have their short-
comings. Courts, however, can provide an opportunity to compare
the effects of different approaches to lead plaintiff selection. This
benefit is not readily available to Congress when it provides top-down
legal results. Legislative rules at the federal level are hard to assess in
comparative terms. Even if individual courts are not situated to see
all of the effects of their chosen approaches, securities litigation out-
comes may be assessed in the aggregate.
When enacting the PSLRA, Congress was correct to focus on which
lead plaintiffs are most likely to be good monitors of securities class
action litigation. The presumption in favor of institutional investors
was a step in the right direction. If Congress permitted courts to more
fully compensate for lead plaintiff expenses; allow for aggregation; use
auctions; increase disclosure regarding conflicts of interest; and, per-
haps, try options not yet considered, it should help further limit
agency costs. If any of the reform ideas function well under this judi-
cial experimentation, courts could move toward adopting them, and
Congress could as well.
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